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APRIL, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THREE
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone
company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and there-
fore of some profound interstitial change in. the very tissue of the law."--
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
NOTES ON RECENT
MISSOURI CASES
MASTER AND SERVANT-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-
INHERENT DANGER. Privitt v. Jewett et al.' The defendants were
owners of a lot in a town of two to three hundred inhabitants. They con-
tracted for the erection of a brick building thereon. During the progress
of the work a part of the wall fronting on the main street of the village
fell outward and plaintiff, a pedestrian on the sidewalk below, was injured.!
Despite the fact that the work was in the exclusive charge of an independ-
1. (1920) 225 S. W. 127 (Opinion by
Trimble, J.).
2. "There was evidence that the wall,
being a 'green wall', might fall or be
jarred down merely by the vibration of the
joists from the workmen walking over the
building, carrying materials. The brick be-
ing wet and not having set, the pressing
of a foot scaffold or the like might cause
it to bulge outward and fall, and in build.
ing such wall adjacent to a public side-
walk it is usual and customary to place
barriers so as to keep persons off the side-
walk, and thereby avoid the danger of their
being hurt." 225 S. W. I. c. 128.
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ent contractor (apparently) defendants were held liable because they failed
to take proper precautions to erect guards or barriers or build a covering
over the sidewalk. The erection of the building was said to produce a
situation of "inherent danger."
One of the most famous of the early English cases on this subject is
Bush v. Steinman.' In that case the owner of real estate was held liable
for the negligence of an employee of a sub-contractor in leaving some
material in a public highway which caused an injury to the plaintiff. The
theory of the court was that the injured party could recover either against
the one who did the act or the one for whose benefit it was done. The court
also seemed to base the liability of the defendant on a supposed rule of
law which held the owner of fixed property liable as an insurer against all
tortious acts committed in connection with it on the principle of sic utere
tuo ut alieniom non laedas. The mistaken theory in that case was followed
in England until Milligan v. Wedge4 which states a different doctrine.
The first English case which marks the beginning of the modern theory
of independent contractor is Laugher v. Pointer.' Two justices out of four
held that the hirer of a job coachman and a team of horses to be used
in connection with his own carriage did not thereby become the master of
the job coachman. Bush v. Steinman' was distinguished because "the same
principle does not apply to personal movable chattels as to the permanent
use and enjoyment of land or houses." In course of time the broad prin-
ciple of Bush v. Steinman was entirely abandoned in England.'
In America the principle had only a brief acceptance.' Many de-
cisions have laid down the general proposition that an employer is not
liable for the negligence of an independent contractor or the latter's servants.'
There are certain well recognized exceptions to this rule. One is that
an employer is responsible if the contract calls for work which is inherently
and intrinsically dangerous. The decision under review is based upon this
exception alone. Obviously the exception is one that is somewhat. intan-
gible and must be handled with care and judgment. Otherwise, under the
guise of an exception the general principle may be undermined.
In Missouri the doctrine of Bush v. Steinman was disapproved in Barry
v. City of St. Louis."° The latter case was probably overruled in Welsh v.
City of St. Louisa but the rule of independent contractor as a general
doctrine still remains.
3. (1799) 1 Bos. & Pul. 404. 8. Lowell v. R. R. (1839) 23 Pick.
4. (1840) 12 A. & E. 737. See also 24; distinguished in Hilliard v. Richard.
Reedie v. London and North Western Ry. ion (1855) 3 Gray (Mass.) 349. (good
Co. (1849) 4 Exeh. 244. review of English cases.) Stone v. R. R.
5. (1826) 4 L. J. (o. s.) K. B. 309, (1849) 19 N. H. 427, questioned in Wright
5 B. & C. 547, 8 D. & R. 556. v. Holbrook (1872) 52 N. H. 120.
6. Supra, note 3. 9. See 14 R. C. L. 79, n. 8.
7. Overton v. Freeman (1852) 11 C. 10. (1852) 17 Mo. 121.
B. 866. 11. (1880) 73. Mo. 71.
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How far have the later Missouri cases qualified the rule? This ques-
tion is one difficult to answer. As is so often true in the law, the abstract
statement causes no difference of opinion but the application of the state-
ment to ever changing facts causes a wide variance of opinion. There-
fore, in such a situation, the most satisfactory solution, i. e. the greatest
assistance in applying the rule, comes from a consideration of cases which
involve facts which resemble the facts under discussion as nearly as pos-
sible. Unfortunately, the writer has found no case in Missouri which is
strikingly similar to the case under review.
What is an act of inherent danger? It is hardly to be doubted that
setting out a fire is such an act.' The Supreme Court of Missouri once
held that blasting rock in the construction of a sewer was subject to the
rule of independent contractor.' The opinion, however, was later dis-
approved in a dissenting opinion" by certain judges of the Supreme Court.
Still later the Springfield Court of Appeals rendered an opinion which does
not mention but seems certainly to be inconsistent with the first blasting
case.' Aside from the actual results there would seem to be satisfactory
reasons for holding that the blasting of rock near a public street is a work
of inherent danger.
Are building operations matters of inherent danger? Excavations seem
in general not to be so considered. In Wiese v. Remme" a landlord con-
tracted for digging a privy vault and the erection of a privy. The vault
was dug but negligently safeguarded by the contractor. A rain filled the
vault with water and the tenant's two year old son fell in and was drowned.
The contractor was held to have been exercising an independent employment
and the landlord was not held responsible.
In McGrath v. St. Louis' the defendant was not liable for the conduct
of a contractor who excavated for an alley which went up to the foun-
dation of plaintiff's house which fell into the excavation. There was evi-
dence that the contractor excavated four to six inches beyond the line.'
Wiggin v. St. Louis et al" may be thought to be a decision contrary to
these cases. The action was against the City of St. Louis, the owner of
a lot and the contractor of the owner who was employed to build a house.
In constructing an entrance to the basement the contractor excavated be-
12. 8 Harv. L. R. 58. 16. (1897) 140 Mo. 289, 41 S. W.
13. Blumb v. City of Kansas (1884) 797.
84 Mo. 112. 17. (1908) 215 Mo. 191, 114 S. W.
14. Salmon v. Kansas City (1911) 611.
241 Mo. 1. c. 69, 145 S. W. 16. 18. See Schweickhart v. St. Lo.is
15. Carson v. Blodgett Construction (1876) 2 Mo. App. 571.
Co. (1915) 189 Mo. App. 120, 174 S. W. 19. (1896) 135 Mo. 558, 37 S. W.
447. 528.
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yond the property line and into the sidewalk space about two feet. He
negligently failed to properly guard the opening and the plaintiff fell in.
The City of St. Louis was held responsible on the theory, apparently, that
it knew or might have known of the dangerous situation through reason-
able attention. The trial court directed a verdict for the owner of the
lot. This was disapproved by the Supreme Court. It was assumed that
the plans called for the excavation and it was held that this was "in-
herently dangerous."'" Two decisions were cited as authority." One is
rather an authority to the contrary since the defense of independent con-
tractor was allowed under circumstances not wholly dissimilar. The other"
was not a case of a work inherently dangerous but one where the owner
furnished defective plans.'
What should be said concerning the erection of objects which may
fall? In Dillon v. Hunt" the question arose upon demurrer to the petition.
Defendant was the owner of a five story building which had been damaged
by fire. It was held that a cause of action had been stated by alleging
that the walls left standing were a nuisance and that defendant knew or
had good reason to know that a dangerous method had been adopted in
removing the building.
Homer, Adir., v. Nicholsoie ' involved damage resulting from the fall
of a wall but it is not a very definite decision. The evidence conflicted as
to whether the fault was that of the defendant owner because of defective
plans, or because of defective work done prior to the appearance of the
contractor in question, or because of the fault of the contractor himself.
In any event there was a final judgment for plaintiff. The fair inference
from the opinion is that if the contractor had been the one at fault the
defendant would have been excused. There seems to be no suggestion that
extensive building repairs constitute a work of inherent danger as a gen-
eral proposition though there was evidence that the particular wall was
left in a condition of inherent danger.
In Lancaster v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co." the defendant in
making repairs contracted for building a wall which was attached to the
rear wall of plaintiff's building. After the new wall had been built or
nearly completed it fell and pulled down a part of plaintiff's wall. The
Supreme Court in affirming a judgment for plaintiff stated that the con-
20. Compare O'Hara v. Gas Light Co. 23. Larson v. Metropolitan St. Ry.
(1912) 244 Mo. 395, 148 S. W. 884. Co. (1892) 110 Mo. 234, 19 S. W. 416.
21. City of Independence v. Slack 24. (1881) 11 Mo. App. 246; s. c.(1896) 134 Mo. 66, 34 S. W. 1049. (1891) 105 Mo. 154, 16 S. W. 516, 24
22. Lancaster v. Connecticut Mutual Am. St. Rep. 374.
Life Ins. Co. (1887) 92 Mo. 460, 5 S. 25. (1874) 56 Mo. 220.
W. 23. 26. (1887) 92 Mo. 460, 5 S. W. 23, 1
Am. St. Rep. 729.
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flicting evidence justified instructions that (a) defendant was responsible
if he failed to provide proper plans and specifications and (b) that de-
fendant was not responsible if the work was insufficiently done by inde-
pendent contractors.
In Scharff v. Southern I11. Const. Co." the Buckingham Investment
Company contracted with the Southern Illinois Construction Company for
the erection of a seven story hotel. One wall (about one hundred eighty-
eight feet long and about ninety feet high) was practically completed when
it fell on plaintiff's house only thirteen feet way. The wall was a green
wall and it fell in a windstorm but the jury found that the falling was not
solely the result of an act of God. There was evidence of negligence in
the construction of the wall. The trial court directed a verdict for the
investment company and from this no appeal was taken. The construction
company sought to relieve itself in the court of appeals by arguing that
it was not" an independent contractor. The St. Louis Court of Appeals in
affirming judgment for plaintiff held that "it was clearly an independent
contractor." There was no suggestion that the work was inherently dan-
gerous.
There have been other decisions in Missouri where the injury was
caused by a falling object. Two" held the doctrine of independent contrac-
tor applicable but it would seem that Loth v. Columbia Theatre Compan3p5
in effect denies the defense. The reasoning is unsatisfactory but it may
be that lowering an electric sign hanging over a public street and weighing
from two hundred to three hundred and fifty pounds was a work of inher-
ent danger.
What should be said concerning the facts in the case under review?
Is the building of an ordinary brick wall along "main street" a work of
inherent danger?
The opinion states that there was evidence that the fall might have
been caused from the vibration of the joists or the pressing of a foot
scaffold in the ordinary course of the work. The most that can be said for
this is that it is pure conjecture and surely a money judgment should not
be rendered on the basis of speculation.
It appears also that there was evidence that it was customary to
place barriers to prevent injury to pedestrians along a sidewalk. It is
submitted, however, that this is done not in anticipation that a wall will
fall but to prevent injuries from the falling of a tool or a piece of ma-
terial. If a wall falls an overhead protection would likely be crushed
27. (1905) 115 Mo. App. 157, 92 S. 29. Press v. Penny &t Gentles (1912)
W. 126. 242 Mo. 98, 145 S. W. 458; Jackson v.
28. How the defendant construction Butler (1913) 249 Mo. 342, 155 S. W.
company hoped to advance its interests 1071 (good opinion by Faris, J.).
by this argument is not seen by the writer. 30. (1906) 197 Mo. 328. 94 S. W. 847.
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and the pedestrian caught in a trap; and a barrier would have to extend
into a street so far that in many places traffic would have to be stopped.
The decision, then, seems to be a declaration that the construction of
an ordinary brick wall or one which is to be a "false front" is a work of
inherent danger. It is submitted that this decision unwisely qualifies the
doctrine of independent contractor and is further evidence of the tendency
to "place it more and more in line with the rules governing master and
servant."'1 If the rule is worth keeping this tendency must be checked.
Of the decisions relied upon in the opinion under review Dillion v. Hunt
and Wiggin v. St. Louis have been discussed, supra. The other two are
not in point. One, Johnson v. J. I. Case etc. Co.," dealt with responsibility
for fire set out by a traction engine with a defective spark arrestor. In
other words, the defendant furnished a defective appliance to its con-
tractee. The other, Cedarland v. Thornpson," is not a case of independent
contractor. There the court expressly stated: "The doctrine of independent
contractor has no application in this case." Homer Admr. v. Nicholson,
Lancaster v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., Scharff v. Southern Ill.
Const. Co. were not cited.
K. C. S.34
NEGLIGENCE-CONDITION OF PREMISES-TURNTABLE
DOCTRINE-RULE IN MISSOURI AND UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT. United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt.' This was a
suit to recover for death of children poisoned in a pool of water contain-
ing sulphuric acid and zinc sulphate in the basement of defendant's aban-
doned factory. The danger was not apparent but the defendant knew of
the condition. The children came on the land from a travelled way not
far distant but it was not proved that they were attracted upon the land
by the pool of water. The children were strangers in the community and
it was not shown, apparently, that they were attracted to the pool by the
fact that it was frequented by residents of the community.
The court through Mr. Justice Holmes stated the so-called "turntable"
doctrine thus, * * * "while it is very plain that temptation is not in-
vitation, it may be held that knowingly to establish and expose, unfenced,
to children of any age when they follow a bait as mechanically as a fish,
something that is certain to attract them, has the legal effect of an invita-
tion to them although not to an adult."' (Italics supplied.)
31. See 14 U-arv. L. R. 62. 34. The author acknowledges assistance
32. (1916) 193 Mo. App. 198, 182 S. rendered by W. E. Miller, LL. B., U. of
W. 1089. Mo., 1922.
33. (1919) 200 Mo. App. 618, 209 S. 1. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299.
W. 554. 2. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299.
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There was a dissenting opinion which seems to ignore the distinction,
made in the majority opinion, that the children were not attracted upon the
land by the thing which caused their death.
There seems to be but one reason for the "turntable" doctrine although
other theories are advanced by courts This is that it is good policy to
impose the duty. All other reasoning seems open to objection. Despite all
precautions of parents, the state, and the landowner himself, a child will
trespass on private property and will often be injured. So, it may be
reasonable to require an owner to take certain precautions although the
children are, in a strict sense, trespassers. Since each maimed and crippled
child is a liability to society as well as a suffering, handicapped human
being, and since, ordinarily, the dangerous condition can be guarded, it
is not too great a burden to require the owner to provide a reasonable safe-
guard,4 or give effective warnings.'
Some courts have considered the turntable doctrine too severe and un-
fair and have refused to establish it.' Others apparently have extended it
to very wide limits.'
It is a matter of satisfaction to record that the Missouri courts, under
the direction of the Supreme Court of Missouri, have been uniformly con-
3. There is often an application of the
maxim "'sic utere tuo ut alienum "on lae-
das." K. C. Ry. Co. v. Fitesimmons
(1879) 22 Kan. 477, 31 Am. R. 203. (A
boy of twelve was injured on a turntable.);
Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Fox (1904) 38
Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81. ("Not an
undue application of the maxim" even
though attraction is on owner's premises.);
Walker v. Potomac etc. Ry. Co. (1906)
105 Va. 226, 53 S. E. 113. (The maxim
"refers only to acts of the landowner, the
effects of which extend beyond the limits
of his property."); Berry v. Railroad
(1908) 214 Mo. 1. c. 604, 114 S. W. 27.
See excellent opinion by Faris, J., in Buddy
v. Union Terminal Ry. Co. (1918) 276
Mo. 276, 207 S. W. 1. c. 824.
4. Edgington v. B. C. R. 6& N. Ry Co.
(1902) 116 Ia. 410, 90 N. W. 95, 57 L.
R. A. 561; University of Mo. Bulletin,
Law Series 2 p. 41; Berry v. Railroad
Company (1908) 214 Mo. 593, 114 S. W.
27.
5. Smalley v. Ry. Co. (1908) 34 Utah
423, 98 Pac. 311; Twist v. Ry. Co.
(1888) 39 Minn. 164, 12 Am. St. Rep.
626, 39 N. W. 402.
6. Ryan v. Tower (1901) 128 Mich.
463, 87 N. W. 644, 55 L. R. A. 310, 92
A. S. R. 481; Frost v. E. Ry. Co. (1887)
64 N. H. 220, 9 Ati. 790, 10 A. S. R.
396; D. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Reich
(1898) 61 N. J. L. 635, 40 Atl. 682, 68
A. S. R. 727; Daniels v. N. Y. & N. E.
Ry. Co. (1891) 154 Mass. 349, 28 N. I,.
283, 13 L. R. A. 248, 26 A. S. R. 253;
Walsh v. Fitchberg Ry. Co. (1895) 145
N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068, 27 L. R. A.
724, 45 A. S. R. 615; Walker v. Poto.
mac etc. Ry. Co. (1906) 105 Va. 226, 53
S. E. 113. See citations in Buddy v.
Union Terminal Ry. Co. (1918) 276 Mo.
276, 207 S. W. 821.
7. Roman v. City of Leavenworth (1913)
90 Kan. 379, 133 Pac. 551 (city dump);
Dublin Cotton Oil Co. v. Jerrard (1897)
91 Texas 289, 42 S. W. 959 (cotton oil
mill); Price v. Water Co. (1897) 58 Kan.
551, 50 Pac. 450, 62 Am. St. Rep. 625
(reservoirs of water); Kansas City v.
Siese (1905) 71 Kan. 283, 80 Pac. 626
(pond, Cunningham, J., dissenting); Done
Brothers Coal and Coke Co. v. Leavitt
(1903) 109 Ill. App. 385 (cistern); Kinch.
low v. Elevator Co. (1896) 57 Ran. 374,
46 Pac. 703 (exhaust steam barrel).
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servative in applying the "turntable" doctrine. There is good basis for
saying that in Missouri, though the language of the opinions is often
broader, the doctrine has been limited to dangerous machinery. At least
so far as has been discovered recoveries have been allowed only in cases
involving turntables and small push cars.' The one discordant opinion'
(though not as discordant as sometimes assumed) has been disapproved."
There has been the same difficulty, however, in Missouri in setting
forth a sound basis for recovery as has been experienced by other courts.
The favorite reason in Missouri seems to be that there exists an implied
invitation.'m Faris, J., however, in a splendid opinion pointed out the weak-
ness of that theory and stated that the "turntable" doctrine is Sli generis,
rested solely upon the humane sentiment of putting humanity above prop-
erty and that the doctrine should not be further extended."
A case precisely like the case being reviewed has not yet arisen in
Missouri, it appears. There have, however, been several cases wherein
children have lost their lives in pools of water and in all but one, which
has been disapproved, liability has been denied."
It seems reasonably safe to predict, therefore, that the Missouri courts
will in the future find themselves wholly in accord with the Supreme
Court of the United States in its limitations upon a rule which it brought
into prominence in this country."
8. Koons v. St. Louis & Iron Mt. R.
R. (1877) 65 Mo. 592 (turntable); Nagel
v. The Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1882) 75 Mo.
653 (turntable); Berry v. Railroad (1908)
214 Mo. 593, 114 S. W. 27 (turntable);
Morrison v. Phelps Stone Co. (1920) 203
Mo. App. 142, 219 S. W. 393 (push cars).
9. Schmidt v. K. C. Distilling Co.
(1886) 90 Mo. 284, 2 S. W. 417 (small
hole made by boiler discharge pipe and con-
taining hot water).
10. Barney v. Railroad (1894) 126
Mo. 372, 28 S. W. 1069 (moving railway
cars); Kelly v. Benas (1909) 217 Mo. 1,
116 S. W. 557, 20 L. R. A. (n. s.) 903
(lumber negligently piled; good opinion);
Rallo at al. v. Heman Const. Co. (1912)
236 S. W. 632 (pool of water in abandoned
quarry).
11. Witte v. Stiel (1894) 126 Mo.
295, 28 S. W. 891 (loose stone on cellar
window frame); Houck v. Railroad (1906)
116 Mo. App. 559, 92 S. W. 738 (pumping
machinery in building); Compton v. Rail-
road (1910) 147 Mo. App. 1. c. 419, 126
S. W. 821 (string of cars); Kelly v.
G. E. WOODRUFF."
Benas (1909) 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557,
20 L. R. A. (n. s.) 903 (lumber negligently
piled); Berry v. Railroad (1908) 214 Mo.
593, 114 S. W. 27 (turntable).
12. Buddy v. Union Terminal Ry.
(1918) 276 Mo. 276, 207 S. W. 821.
13. Moran v. Pullman Car Co. (1896)
134 Mo. 641, 36 S. W. 659; Smith v.
Packing Co. (1899) 82 Mo. App. 9; Over-
holt v. Vieths (1887) 93 Mo. 422, 6 S. W.
74; Rallo et al. v. Heman Const. Co.
(1921) 236 S. W. 632. In Carey v.
Kansas City (1905) 187 Mo. 715, 86 S.
W. 438, and Capp v. St. Louis (191.3)
251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616, the turn-
table doctrine was held inapplicable for
other reasons.
14. Cases in Missouri other than those
mentioned, supra. are: Rushenberg v. St.
L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1892) 109 Mo.
112, 19 S. W. 216 (unloading ice from
Continued on p. 35.
15. Student, School of Law, University
of Missouri.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SELF DEFENSE-BURDEN OF PROOF.
State v. Roberts In this case Higbee, J., stated by way of dictum: "The bur-
den is not on the state to prove that the killing was without justification. It
is upon the defendant to prove any affirmative matter in excuse, justification
or extenuation of the offense, and he must show to the satisfaction of the
jury that he acted in self defense."'
Kelley on Criminal Law and Practice was the only authority cited
for the statement. This work purports to deal with the criminal law of
Missouri and no doubt has obtained some vogue. It is not a most satisfac-
tory and scientific work and the section cited in the case under review is
believed to be inaccurate.
The proposition is simply this: a man is accused of homicide for instance.
The plea is not guilty. In truth, he wishes the jury to believe that his
conduct was in necessary defense of his person. Who has the burden of
convincing the jury on the issue of self defense?
The problem is no different from any other problem dealing with the
burden of proof. The confusion (and it is great) lies in the fundamental
failure to distinguish two very different things which unfortunately are
grouped in many opinions under the same general term, "burden of proof."'
The two things are: (1) burden of convincing or risk of non-persuasion,
and (2) burden of going forward with the evidence.
If there is any single principle which will inform one which party in
a law suit has the burden of convincing, judges and scholars have not yet
discovered it.' The solution in any given case may be the result of various
factors, i. e. the state of the pleading, the history of the action, the con-
(1922) 242 S. W. 669.
(1922) 242 S. W. I. c. 674.
Third edition, section 253.
19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483 (note);
Wigmore on Evidence, sections 2485 and
2487.
5. Wigmore on Evidence, section 2486;
Phipson on Evidence (6th ed.) pp. 30.
37.
Continued from p. 34.
freight car); Arnold v. St. Louis (1899)
152 Mo. 173, 75 Am. St. Rep. 447, 53
S. W. 900. (skating); Buta v. Cavanagh
(1896) 137 Mo. 503, 38 S. W. 1104
(smouldering fire in abandoned quarry);
)light v. Baking Co. (1912) 168 Mo. App.
431, 151 S. W. 776 (slowly moving display
wagon); State ex rel. v. Ellison (1919)
281 Mo. 667, 220 S. W. 498 (retaining
wall; if case had been presented on
theory of Capp v. St. Louis, supra, would
result have been the same?); O'Hara v.
Gas Light Co. (1912) 244 Mo. 395, 148
S. W. 884 (iron pipes).
United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt
has been reviewed and commented upon in
1 Texas Law Review, 6, 18; 36 Harv.
L. R. 113; 32 Yale L. J. 200; 8 Cor-
nell L. Quar. 85. See also 8 Iowa L.
Blulletin 61.
United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt
has been followed in New York, New
Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Fruchter
(1922) 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38, reviewed in
71 Penn. Law Rev. 183, 32 Yale Law J.
298, and 36 Haiv. L. R. 350.
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venience with which one party or the other may produce evidence of certain
facts. There is no rule of thumb unless it be that of stare decisis. Even
this is subject to change. Prosecutions for criminal offenses present no
peculiar problem except for the general tendency in the common law of
caution in favor of the accused.
Primitive law was formal and unmoral. A student of legal history
can readily understand the point of view which would place the burden of
convincing upon a defendant that he acted in self defense.
"Did the early English law so completely ignore the moral quality of
the act of killing in self defense as to make it a crime? Strictly speaking,
yes. An official reporter of the time of Edward III and Lord Coke were
doubtless in error in stating that prior to 1267 a man was 'hanged in such
a case just as if he had acted feloniously.' But such a killing was not
justifiable homicide. The party indicted was not entitled to an acquittal by
the jury. He was sent back to prison, and must trust to the King's mercy
for pardon. Furthermore, although he obtained the pardon, he forfeited
his goods for the crime. But the moral sense of the community could
not tolerate indefinitely the idea that a blameless self-defender was a crimi-
nal, or that he should have to make compensation to his culpable assailant.
By 1400 self-defense had become a bar to an action for a battery. Pardons
for killing in self-defense became a matter of course; ultimately the jury
was allowed to give a verdict of not guilty in such cases, and the practice
of forfeiting the goods of the defendant died out."'  Thus is the subject
dicussed by a competent scholar of legal history.
Perhaps, then, the notion that the burden of convincing of self-defense
is on the defendant is only a survival in a changed form of an earlier rule.
If so, it seems to demonstrate what a learned man has stated.7 "Learning,
my learned brethren, is a very good thing. I should be the last to under-
value it, having done my share of quotation from the Year Books. But it
is liable to lead us astray. The law, so far as it depends on learning, is in-
deed, as it has been called, the government of the living by the dead. To
a very considerable extent no doubt it is inevitable that the living should be
so governed. The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of
our imagination; we cannot get away from it. There is, too, a peculiar
logical pleasure in making manifest the continuity between what we are
doing and what has been done before. But the present has a right to govern
itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be remembered that historic
continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity."
The decisions in this country seem fairly well divided. Some place the
burden of convincing on the prosecution; some place this burden on the
6. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 7. Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal
435-436. Essays, p. 138-139.
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defendant; some are not clear, chiefly because they confuse the burden of
convincing and the burden of going forward.'
It is difficult to prove that the Supreme Court of Missouri has clearly
placed itself on either side. There are decisions in Missouri which favor
both points of view. The writer has come to the same conclusion as the
writer of a note in Lawyers' Reports Annotated.!
"The cases in Missouri are contradictory, but the decisions which ap-
parently are the most carefully considered hold that the defendant is en-
titled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt of his guilt arising on the whole
case."
One of the best reasoned opinions in Missouri is State v. Wingo. ° It
clearly stated the fundamental difference between the burden of convincing
and the burden of going forward with the evidence and then held the fol-
lowing instruction improperly placed the burden of convincing on the de-
fendant:
"If defendant shot and killed Gamble, the law presumes that it is murder
in the second degree, in the absence of proof to the contrary, and it de-
volves upon the defendant, Wingo, to show, from the evidence in the
cause, to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, that he was guilty of a
less crime, or acted in self-defense.
The conviction was reversed. Of the five judges, two Norton and
Hough, concurred in the result only.
It is rather curious that such a splendid opinion should have failed in
making itself a decisive factor in the Missouri decisions. Perhaps this may be
explained by the opinion of the same judge at the same term in State v.
Alexander." That opinion is far from satisfactory and seems to be some-
thing of a compromise. Nevertheless, State v. Wingo, supra, was expressly
approved. It was held, apparently, that an instruction on reasonable doubt
would cure an error in an instruction such as that condemned in State v.
Wingo. This seems a doubtfully sound doctrine.
The holding in State v. Wingo, supra, was approved and followed
in State v. Hill.' Again, however, there was some indefinite discussion
as to the effect that an instruction on reasonable doubt would have in
neutralizing the error.
In a prosecution for an assault with intent to kill it was held error to
instruct the jury that "it devolves upon the defendant to show to the satis-
faction of the jury, some satisfactory grounds for making such assault, and
unless he has so done, the jury should find him guilty."'
8. Wigmore on Evidence, section 2512; 10. (1877) 66 Mo. 181.
19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483 (note); 21 11. (1877) 66 Mo. 148.
Cyc. 883; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12. (1879) 69 Mo. 451, 1. c. 453.
pp. 1818-1820. 13. State v. Hickam (1888) 95 Mo.
9. 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 491. 322, 8 S. W. 252.
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The contrary point of view seems to find its genesis in State v. Hays,1
where, in a case of murder, it was stated that "it devolves upon the de-
fendant to show from the evidence in the cause, to the reasonable satisfac-
tion of the jury, that he was guilty of a less crime, or acted in self-defense."
(Italics supplied.) However, the point under discussion seems not to have
been considered in that decision.
In State v. Holme5 is the statement that every homicide is deemed
malicious unless justified, excused or palliated and that the proof of the
justification, etc., rests upon the accused unless evolved in the testimony
produced by the state. There seems to be no objection to such a statement.
It refers to the duty of going forwardt with the evidence and not with the
burden of convincing.
In State v. Underwood" the statement quoted from State v. Hays,
supra, is repeated but again the opinion does not discuss the proposition
whether thereby the burden of convincing was fairly placed on defendant.
In State v. Brown" it was held that it was not error to refuse to in-
struct 'that the burden of proof was on the state to prove a case against
defendant, not only that he killed Long, but that he did so without any
justifiable or legal excuse, or extenuating circumstances.' There was no
discussion and the authorities cited were State v. Hays and State v. Under-
wood, supra.
It is worth mentioning that the judge who wrote the opinion in State
v. Brown. supra, also wrote the opinion in State v, Wingo, and that he
wrote both opinions in the same year. Furthermore, State v. Wing0 does
not mention any of the Missouri cases which seem to stand for the opposite
rule. Apparently, the only way to reconcile the Brown and Wingo cases
is to state that in the Brown case the term, "burden of proof" was used in
the sense of the burden of going forward with the evidence.
State v. Tabor restates the proposition obtained from State v. Hays
and State v. Underwood, supra. There is reason to believe, however, that
the court was only attempting to state the law with reference to the duty
of going forward with the evidence of self-defense and not the law con-
cerning the burden of convincing of the existence of self-defense. The
court had already stated that it did not believe that there was any self-
defense in the case. The statement by the court as a proposition of the
duty of going forward with the evidence would seem sound if the phrase
"to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury" had been omitted."
14. (1856) 23 Mo. 287, 1. c. 323. 19. Compare State v. Jennings (1883)
15. (1873) 54 Mo. 153, 1, c. 163. 81 Mo. 185 (larceny; defense of alibi;
16. (1874) 57 Mo. 40, 1. c. 49. duty of convincing apparently on de-
17. (1877) 64 Mo. 367, 1. c. 375. fendant; two of five judges dissent on
18. (1888) 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. W. 744. authority of State v. Wingo, supra.)
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State v. Jones" and State v. Beckner"1 deal with the proposition herein
discussed but not in a very decisive way.
Enough appears to demonstrate that the Missouri Supreme Court ap-
parently has been on both sides of the question. Either view can be sup-
ported. It is not merely a matter of logic but of experience. Is a defend-
ant to have the benefit of self defense if the jury has a reasonable doubt
as to its existence? Is the defendant bound to convince the jury to its
reasonable satisfaction that he acted in self-defense? Such are the alter-
natives. In any event the dictum of Higbee, J., seems not to be an accurate
statement of the existing Missouri law.
Frank Doyle."
20. (1883) 78 Mo. 278. 22. Student, University of Missouri
21. (1905) 194 Mo. 281, 1. c. 299, 91 School of Law.
S. W. 892.
